Major Defeat Dealt to States Seeking to Apportion Income Using the "Operational Function Test"

The U.S. Supreme Court issued a very interesting ruling affirming its earlier decisions related to the taxation of "unitary businesses".  (See MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Department of Revenue, U.S. Supreme Court, Dkt. 06-1413, vacating the Illinois Appellate Court, April 15, 2008).

 

In this case, Mead had sold Lexis-Nexis for a $1Billion gain. That gain was allocated to Ohio by Mead. Illinois audited them and took the position that the gain should have been apportioned to IL. IL made the argument at the trial court (which agreed with the State) that although the businesses weren't unitary, the asset (Lexis-Nexis) was used in an "operational function", it should be apportioned. This "operational function" concept has arisen in a couple of recent US Supreme decisions. It has apparently given the states the idea that there is no such thing as allocable income anymore because all they have to do is argue that the asset involved was used in an operation function and they can apportion it. Of course, only the extraterritorial states want to make this argument. But the Supremes in this case, say the IL court erred in their interpretation of this test. See below for their commentary:

"As the foregoing history confirms, our references to "operational function" in Container Corp. and Allied-Signal were not intended to modify the unitary business principle by adding a new ground for apportionment. The concept of operational function simply recognizes that an asset can be a part of a taxpayer's unitary business even if what we may term a "unitary relationship" does not exist between the "payor and payee." See Allied-Signal, supra, at 791-792 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Hellerstein, State Taxation of Corporate Income from Intangibles: Allied-Signal and Beyond, 48 Tax L. Rev. 739, 790 (1993) (hereinafter Hellerstein). In the example given in Allied-Signal, the taxpayer was not unitary with its banker, but the taxpayer's deposits (which represented working capital and thus operational assets) were clearly unitary with the taxpayer's business. In Corn Products, the taxpayer was not unitary with the counterparty to its hedge, but the taxpayer's futures contracts (which served to hedge against the risk of an increase in the price of a key cost input) were likewise clearly unitary with the taxpayer's business. In each case, the "payor" was not a unitary part of the taxpayer's business, but the relevant asset was. The conclusion that the asset served an operational function was merely instrumental to the constitutionally relevant conclusion that the asset was a unitary part of the business being conducted in the taxing State rather than a discrete asset to which the State had no claim. Our decisions in Container Corp. and Allied-Signal did not announce a new ground for the constitutional apportionment of extrastate values in the absence of a unitary business. Because the Appellate Court of Illinois interpreted those decisions to the contrary, it erred."

 

How did the IL courts err? Well, this is where it gets interesting. If it were just an asset, they would have been fine, I guess. But this was not just an asset, but another business. Therefore, this "operation function test" doesn't apply. You must apply the unitary test. I'm not sure I understand the distinction. But here it is in their words:

"Where, as here, the asset in question is another business, we have described the "hallmarks" of a unitary relationship as functional integration, centralized management, and economies of scale. See Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U. S., at 438 (citing Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501, 506-508 (1942)); see also Allied-Signal, supra, at 783 (same); Container Corp., supra, at 179 (same); F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept. of N. M., 458 U. S. 354, 364 (1982) (same).
 
So on that basis they vacated the appellate court's decision. They did point out that although the trial court had concluded that Mead and Lexis-Nexis were not unitary, that issue wasn't considered in the appeal. The appellate court was invited to consider that question on remand.

Since the trial court already determined that they weren't unitary, it seems logical that IL will lose this case. We will be interested to see how it turns out.

Texas Offers 30 Day Extension on Margin Tax Filing

Texas --Corporate Income Tax: Comptroller Extends Filing Date by 30 Days

In a Press Release, issued by Texas Comptroller Susan Combs, dated, April 22, 2008 it was announced that businesses unable to meet the May 15 due date for the revised franchise tax, also referred to as the business margin tax, are being granted a 30-day extension to submit their returns or file an extension without penalty. Reports filed on or before June 16, 2008, for annual reports and June 2, 2008, for initial reports will be considered timely. Prior to the extension, a 5% penalty would have been imposed on those not filing by May 15. The comptroller's office is allowing the additional 30 days due to the complexity of the revised franchise tax and the newness of the enhanced electronic reporting methods.

 

 

 

Millionaires in MD Beware

I don't know how many of our Blog readers in MD are Millionaires -- probably a lot I would guess. Here's a recent development targeting you or your client:

 

Senate Bill 46, effective July 1, 2008, temporarily (yeah, right) increases the personal income tax rate for those with Maryland taxable income in excess of $1,000,000. For taxable years beginning after December 31, 2007, but before January 1, 2011, the Maryland personal income tax for an individual, including spouses filing a joint return or a surviving spouse or head of household, is 6.25%. Currently, the highest income tax rate is 5.5% and applies to individuals, spouses filing a joint return or a surviving spouse or head of household with Maryland taxable income in excess of $500,000. Those with a Maryland taxable income of $500,001 through $1,000,000 are taxed at the rate of 5.5% for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2007, and ending before January 1, 2011.

I guess MD, doesn't like high earning individuals living in their state.